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a b s t r a c t
Continuous first-order logic is used to applymodel-theoretic analysis to analytic structures
(e.g. Hilbert spaces, Banach spaces, probability spaces, etc.). Classical computable model
theory is used to examine the algorithmic structure of mathematical objects that can
be described in classical first-order logic. The present paper shows that probabilistic
computation (sometimes called randomized computation) and continuous logic stand in
a similar close relationship.
The main result of this paper is an effective completeness theorem, showing that every
decidable continuous first-order theory has a probabilistically decidable model. We also
show that probabilistically computable structures give rise to a model of ACA0in a natural
way, and describe a connection with complexity theory.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Continuous first-order logic was introduced in [4,2] as a model-theoretic context sufficient to handle stability theory
for so-called ‘‘metric structures’’. These are many-sorted structures in which each sort is a complete metric space of
finite diameter. Key examples include Hilbert spaces, Banach spaces, probability spaces, and probability spaces with a
distinguished automorphism. Those which do not natively have finite diameter may be treated as increasing sequences
of balls.
For classical first-order model theory, there is a meaningful sense of computation and effectiveness: in a group, for
instance, we have a reasonable algorithmic understanding of a group if the set of triples constituting the Cayley table
(equivalently, the set of words equal to the identity element) is decidable. Of course, there are often still many algorithmic
unknowns in the group, such as the conjugacy problem and the isomorphism problem [9]. The aim of the present paper is
to provide a similar framework for continuous first-order logic.
The framework suggested is probabilistic computation. This model of computation has seen wide use in complexity
theory [13,22], and there is some room for hope that an understanding of the relationship between continuous and classical
first-order logic might yield insights into the relationship between probabilistic and deterministic computation. Section 6
gives reasons for such hope.
Nevertheless, it is cause for contentment that a way can be found to meaningfully talk about algorithmic information
in the context of metric structures. The impossibility of finding an algorithm to solve arbitrary Diophantine equations
(see [16]), the relationship of isoperimetric functions to the word problem [19,5], and much more depend on a notion of
computation adequate to the context of countable rings (in the case of Diophantine equations) and groups (in the case of
the word problem). The present paper describes a context in which such questions can be posed for metric structures.
A key argument to the fact that probabilistic computation is the right algorithmic framework for this context is that it
admits an effective completeness theorem. The classical theorem is as follows.
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Theorem 1.1 (Effective Completeness Theorem). A (classically) decidable theory has a (classically) decidable model.
A full proof of this result may be found in [11], but it was knownmuch earlier, at least toMillar [17]. Themain theoretical
contribution of the present paper will be to interpret the terms of this theorem in such a way as to apply to a continuous
first-order theory and probabilistic computation. Themain result of the present paper is the proof in Section 4 of the theorem
naturally corresponding to Theorem 1.1.
One may read this result in the other direction, as well. Just as probabilistic computation is the ‘‘right’’ model of
computation for CFO logic, so also this main result shows that continuous first-order logic specifies the behavior of
probabilistically computable functions.
Section 2 will describe the syntax and semantics for continuous first-order logic. The reader familiar with [3] or [2]
will find nothing new in Section 2, except a choice of a finite set of logical connectives (no such choice is yet canonical in
continuous first-order logic). Section 3 will define probabilistic Turing machines and the class of structures they compute.
Section 4will contain the proof of themain result. Section 5will describe a sense inwhich ‘‘effectivemathematics’’ as viewed
from the context of probabilistically computable structures is a good deal stronger than classical effective mathematics. In
Section 6 we will conclude with some remarks on time complexity of structures.
Throughout the paper, we will use lh(σ ) to denote the length of σ .
2. Continuous first-order logic
We will, in keeping with the existing literature on continuous first-order logic, adopt the slightly unusual convention of
using 0 as a numerical value for True (or acceptance) and 1 as a numerical value for False (or rejection). The authors of [4]
chose this convention to emphasize the metric nature of their logic.
Continuous first-order logic is an extension of Łukasiewicz propositional logic, which builds on work of Keisler and
Henson (see [2] for a more detailed history). The following definitions are from [3].
2.1. Semantics
Definition 2.1. A continuous signature is an object of the formL = (R,F ,G, n, d)where
(1) R (which we will call the set of predicate symbols) and F (which we will call the function symbols) are disjoint andR is
nonempty, and
(2) n is a function associating to each member ofR ∪ F its arity
(3) G has the form {δs,i : (0, 1] → (0, 1] : s ∈ R ∪ F and i < ns}, and
(4) d is a special symbol.
Because of the context, we will use the notation nS = n(S) for the arity function. We now define the class of structures.
Definition 2.2. Let L = (R,F ,G, n, d) be a continuous signature. A continuous L-pre-structure is an ordered pairM =
(M, ρ), whereM is a nonempty set, and ρ is a function onR ∪ F ∪ {d} taking values in sets of maps defined on Cartesian
powers ofM , such that
(1) To each function symbol f , the function ρ assigns a mapping fM : Mnf → M
(2) To each predicate symbol P , the function ρ assigns a mapping PM : MnP → [0, 1].
(3) The function ρ assigns d to a pseudo-metric dM : M ×M → [0, 1]. (Note: a pseudo-metric is a symmetric nonnegative
function into the reals satisfying the triangle inequality.)
(4) For each f ∈ F for each i < nf , the element δf ,i ∈ G is a modulus of continuity for f in the ith argument; that is, for each
ϵ ∈ (0, 1], we have
∀a¯, b¯, c, e dM(c, e) < δf ,i(ϵ)⇒ dM fM(a¯, c, b¯), fM(a¯, e, b¯) < ϵ
where lh(a¯) = i and lh(a¯)+ lh(b¯) = nf − 1.
(5) For each P ∈ R for each i < nP , the element δP,i ∈ G is a modulus of continuity for P in the ith argument; that is, for
each ϵ ∈ (0, 1], we have
∀a¯, b¯, c, e dM(c, e) < δf ,i(ϵ)⇒ |PM(a¯, c, b¯)− PM(a¯, e, b¯)| < ϵ
where lh(a¯) = i and lh(a¯)+ lh(b¯) = nP − 1.
Definition 2.3. A continuous weakL-structure is a continuousL-pre-structure such that ρ assigns to d a metric.
Since we are concerned here with countable structures, we will not use the stronger notion of a continuous L-structure
common in the literature, which requires that d be assigned to a completemetric. However, it is possible, given a continuous
weak structure (even a pre-structure), to pass to a completion [3].
We now proceed to define formulas and their evaluation. The following definition may be found in [2].
Definition 2.4. LetL be a continuous signature.
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(1) TheL-terms are defined inductively as follows:
(a) Every variable is a term.
(b) If t1, . . . , tn are terms and f is an n-ary function symbol, then f (t1, . . . , tn) is a term.
(2) The atomic L-formulas are the expressions P(t1, . . . , tn), where P is an n-ary predicate symbol, and the expressions
d(t1, t2), where ti are terms.
(3) The quantifier-free L-formulas are the smallest class containing all atomic L-formulas and satisfying the following
closure condition:
• If u : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is continuous and ϕi are formulas, then u(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a formula.
(4) TheL-formulas are the smallest class containing all the atomicL-formulas and closed under both the previous condition
and the following one:
• If ϕ is anL-formula and x is a variable, then supx ϕ and infx ϕ are bothL-formulas.
In practice, a much smaller set of formulas is entirely adequate. Any L-formula may be approximated to arbitrary
accuracy, for instance, by a formula where u is taken from−· , x → 1 − x, and x → 12x. This result, and many others like it,
are documented in [2]. Throughout the rest of the present paper, then, we will work only with this reduced set of formulas.
Definition 2.5. Let V denote the set of variables, and let σ : V → M . Let ϕ be a formula.
(1) The interpretation under σ of a term t (written tM,σ ) is defined by replacing each variable x in t by σ(x).
(2) Let ϕ be a formula. We then define the value of ϕ inM under σ (writtenM(ϕ, σ )) as follows:
(a) M(P(t¯), σ ) := PM(tM,σ )
(b) M(α−· β, σ ) := max (M(α, σ )−M(β, σ ), 0)
(c) M(¬α, σ ) := 1−M(α, σ )
(d) M( 12α, σ ) := 12M(α, σ )
(e) M(supx α, σ ) := supa∈MM(α, σ ax ), where σ ax is equal to σ except that σ ax (x) = a.
(3) We write (M, σ ) |H ϕ exactly whenM(ϕ, σ ) = 0.
Of course, if ϕ has no free variables, then the value ofM(ϕ, σ ) is independent of σ .
At certain points in the present paper, we will need to appeal to a proof system for CFO logic. In particular, we will often
make choices in the course of a construction based on seeing a proof of a given sentence. The following axiom system was
given in [3], and soundness and completeness results were proved there. The axioms are stated here for completeness, since
they are not well known.
(A1) (ϕ−· ψ)−· ϕ
(A2) ((χ −· ϕ)−· (χ −· ψ))−· (ψ −· ϕ)
(A3) (ϕ−· (ϕ−· ψ))−· (ψ −· (ψ −· ϕ))
(A4) (ϕ−· ψ)−· (¬ψ −· ¬ϕ)
(A5) 12ϕ−· (ϕ−· 12ϕ)
(A6) (ϕ−· 12ϕ)−· 12ϕ.
(A7) (supx ψ −· supx ϕ)−· supx (ψ −· ϕ)
(A8) ϕ[t/x] −· supx ϕ where no variable in t is bound by a quantifier in ϕ.
(A9) supx ϕ−· ϕ, wherever x is not free in ϕ.
(A10) d(x, x)
(A11) d(x, y)−· d(y, x)
(A12) (d(x, z)−· d(x, y))−· d(y, z)
(A13) For each f ∈ F , each ϵ ∈ (0, 1], and each r, q ∈ D with r > ϵ and q < δf ,i(ϵ), the axiom (q−· d(z, w)) ∧
(d (f (x¯, z, y¯), f (x¯, w, y¯))−· r), where lh(x¯)+ lh(y¯) = nf − 1.
(A14) For each P ∈ R, each ϵ ∈ (0, 1], and each r, q ∈ D with r > ϵ and q < δP,i(ϵ), the axiom (q−· d(z, w)) ∧
((P(x¯, z, y¯)−· P(x¯, w, y¯))−· r), where lh(x¯)+ lh(y¯) = nP − 1.
Axioms A1–A4 are those of Łukasiewicz propositional logic, and axioms A5–A6 complete the propositional part of
continuous logic (primarily prescribing the behavior of 12 . Axioms A7–A9 describe the role of the quantifiers. axioms
A10–A12 guarantee that d is a pseudo-metric, and axioms A13–A14 guarantee uniform continuity of functions and
predicates. We write Γ ⊢Q ϕ whenever ϕ is provable from Γ in continuous first-order logic, as axiomatized above. Where
no confusion is likely, we will write Γ ⊢ ϕ.
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3. Probabilistically computable structures
Recall that a Turingmachinewith an oracle is a Turingmachinewith the additional capability of reading from a read-only
tape (presented once for all at the outset of the computation) and altering its internal state as a result of this read. We refer
to the content of this read-only tape as the ‘‘oracle’’. In the context of this paper, the oracles will typically be binary strings
— that is, elements of 2ω . The reader should recall that in any particular (terminating) computation, only a finite substring
of the oracle will be used, since the programwill terminate; in fact, many of our constructions will consist of instructing the
machine to halt with a particular output when it sees a particular finite string in the oracle.
If M is a Turing machine, we write Mx(n) for the result of applying M to input n with oracle x. Excepting the polarity
change to match the conventions above, the following definition is standard; it may be found, for instance, in [22].
Definition 3.1. Let 2ω be the set of infinite binary sequences, with the usual Lebesgue probability measure µ.
(1) A probabilistic Turing machine is a Turing machine equipped with an oracle for an element of 2ω , called the random bits,
with output in {0, 1}.
(2) We say that a probabilistic Turing machineM accepts n with probability p if and only if µ{x ∈ 2ω : Mx(n) ↓= 0} = p.
(3) We say that a probabilistic Turing machineM rejects n with probability p if and only if µ{x ∈ 2ω : Mx(n) ↓= 1} = p.
Definition 3.2. LetL be a computable continuous signature (i.e. one where the sets of predicate and function symbols, the
set of moduli, and the arity function are all computable — and, a fortiori, countable). LetM be a continuous L-structure.
Let L(M) be the expansion of L by a constant cm for each m in the universe ofM (i.e. a unary predicate cm ∈ R where
cMm (x) := d(x,m)). Then the continuous atomic diagram of M, written D(M) is the set of all pairs (ϕ, p), where ϕ is a
quantifier-free (i.e. sup- and inf-free) sentence in L(M) and M(ϕ, σ ) = p. The continuous elementary diagram D∗(M)
is the same, except that ϕ is not required to be quantifier-free.
Note that the definition is independent of σ , since a sentence has no free variables.
Definition 3.3. We say that a continuous pre-structure M is probabilistically computable (respectively, probabilistically
decidable) if and only if there is some probabilistic Turing machine T such that, for every pair (ϕ, p) ∈ D(M) (respectively,
D∗(M)) the machine T accepts ϕ with probability p.
This definition parallels the classical definition. Classically, a first-order structure is said to be computable if its (classical
first-order) atomic diagram is decidable, as a set of Gödel numbers (see [1,11]). Suppose T is a deterministicmachine (i.e. one
that makes no use of its random bits; a classical Turing machine) andM a classical first-order structure. Then Definition 3.3
corresponds exactly to the classical definition of a computable structure.
We cannot do entirely without the probabilistic machines (that is, we cannot thoroughly understand probabilistically
computable structures using only classical Turingmachines), as the following result shows. LetD denote the dyadic numbers
in the interval (i.e. those of the form k2n for k, n ∈ N). We now consider the set {(ϕ, p) ∈ D(M) : p ∈ D}, whereM is a
continuous structure. Since we restrict values toD , the set is amenable to classical computation.
Lemma 3.4 (No Derandomization Lemma). There is a probabilistically computable weak structureM such that the set {(ϕ, p) ∈
D(M) : p ∈ D} is not classically computable.
Proof. Let U be a computably enumerable set, and let S be the complement of U . We first construct a probabilistically
computable function f such that
P(f σ (x) = 0) = 1
2
if and only if x ∈ S. Begin with f0 = ∅. Throughout the construction, we will use Ut to denote the elements of U which have
been enumerated by stage t (so, as is customary, we have implicitly picked an enumeration of U , as well; no generality is
lost, since the particular enumeration does not impact the validity of the proof).
At stage t , if x /∈ Ut , pick two strings σt , τt of length t + 2 such that ft(x) does not halt with random bits σt or τt . We
define the function ft+1 := ft ∪ {f σt (x) = 0, f τt (x) = 1}. On the other hand, if x ∈ Ut , then we arrange that f σt+1(x) = 0 for
all σ of length at most t + 2 where f σt (x) does not halt. Let f =

t∈ω ft . Now if x ∈ S, we never see x ∈ Ut , so f (x) = 0 with
probability 12 . Otherwise, there is some t such that x ∈ Ut − Ut−1, and then f (x) = 0 with probability 1−
∑t
i=2 2−i >
1
2 .
Nowwe letM be the structure (ω, f ), where f is interpreted as a unary predicate in the obvious way, and d is the discrete
metric. If we could decide membership in {(ϕ, p) ∈ D(M) : p ∈ D} with a classical Turing machine, then we could also
decide membership in U . 
Of course, this same argument could work for any other uniformly computable set of reals in place ofD . The following
proposition, on the other hand, indicates a sense in which the diagrams of probabilistically computable structures may be
approximated by Turing machines.
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Proposition 3.5. For any probabilistically computable pre-structure M, there is some (classically) computable function f
(practically defined onL(M)-formulas in one variable and natural numbers in the other — although we could replace the formula
with a natural number code), monotonically increasing in the second variable, and some (classically) computable function g,
monotonically decreasing in the second variable, such that for any pair (ϕ, p) ∈ D(M), we have lims→∞ f (ϕ, s) = p and
lims→∞ g(ϕ, s) = p.
Proof. LetM be computed by the probabilistic Turing machine TM. Let (σs)s∈ω be an effective list of all strings in 2<ω (i.e.
the space of all finite binary strings, although we may follow convention in identifying these strings with elements of 2ω
which have are eventually zero). Now we define
f (ϕ, s) :=
−
i≤s

T σiM(ϕ) · 2−lh(σi)

.
The definition of g is symmetric. These clearly have the correct properties. 
Functions similar to f and g are often seen in classical computable model theory [14,12,7,6] (in the characterization of
countable Abelian p-groups with classically computable copies, for instance). Nevertheless, the definition via probabilistic
machines gives a more natural continuity with the established literature on continuous first-order model theory [2]. In
addition, this definition is in any case not dispensable when, for instance, time complexity of computation is at issue
(see Section 6).
4. Effective completeness
Theorem1.1 is an important piece of evidence that classical Turing computation (or any of themany equivalent concepts)
is properly synchronized with classical first-order logic. In particular, it asserts that under the minimal, obviously necessary
hypotheses, a classical first-order theory has a model which can be represented by a classical computation. The aim of the
present section is to prove a similar result for continuous first-order logic and probabilistic computation.
Definition 4.1. Let M be a continuous L-structure. We write Th(M) for the set of continuous L-sentences ϕ such that
M(ϕ) = 0. We say that T is complete if T = Th(M) for someM.
We follow Turing [23] in defining a computable real number as a number x such that the function passing from n to the nth
digit of x is a computable function, and in taking any index for such a function to be an index for x. The following analogue
to the classical concept of the decidability of a theory was proposed in [3].
Definition 4.2. LetL be a continuous signature and Γ a set of formulas ofL.
(1) We define
ϕ◦Γ := sup {M(ϕ, σ ) : (M, σ ) |H Γ }.
(2) If T is a complete continuous first-order theory, we say that T is decidable if and only if there is a (classically) computable
function f , called a decision procedure for T such that f (ϕ) is an index for a computable real number equal to ϕ◦T .
Decidability will allow us to check (up to finite precision) the truth value of a sentence, and thus will be a critical
ingredient in forming a maximal consistent set.
4.1. The main result
We will need some auxiliary definitions for the proof. Both are straightforward adaptations of their classical Henkin
analogues, and were given in [3].
Definition 4.3. Let Γ be a set of formulas. Then Γ is said to be Henkin complete if for every formula ϕ, every variable x, and
every p < q ∈ D , there is a constant c such that
(sup
x
ϕ−· q) ∧ (p−· ϕ[c/x]) ∈ Γ .
Definition 4.4. Let ∆ be a set of formulas. We say that ∆ is maximal consistent if ∆ is consistent and for all formulas ϕ,ψ
we have
(1) If∆ ⊢ ϕ−· 2−n for all n, then ϕ ∈ ∆, and
(2) ϕ−· ψ ∈ ∆ or ψ −· ϕ ∈ ∆.
Theorem 4.5. Let T be a complete decidable continuous first-order theory. Then there is a probabilistically decidable continuous
weak structureM such thatM |H T .
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Proof. To facilitate reading, several technical lemmas are deferred to Section 4.2. The construction of a modelM is given in
[3], by an analogue of Henkin’s method. Our model will be essentially the same, except that some care must be taken with
effectiveness. The principal novelty of the theorem consists in showing that this structure is probabilistically decidable. In
particular, the model constructed in [3] includes some blatant non-effectiveness: a test for whether ϕ◦T = 0, which cannot
be effectively determined from amere code for ϕ◦T . We will show that the information in the decision procedure for T is still
enough to produce a probabilistically computable structure.
We will define a probabilistic Turing machine which, for any formula ϕ, accepts ϕ with probability M(ϕ). Let T be a
complete decidable CFO theory. We begin by adding Henkin witnesses.
We will show in Lemma 4.6 that we can effectively extend T to a consistent set Γ of formulas which is Henkin complete,
and in Lemma 4.7 that we can extend Γ again to a consistent set ∆0 such that for all formulas ϕ,ψ in the new language
L∗ (the enrichment is necessary to account for the Henkin completeness), we have ϕ−· ψ ∈ ∆0 or ψ −· ϕ ∈ ∆0. Moreover,
Lemma 4.7 will establish that there is a uniformly computable sequence (∆s)s∈ω of finite sets such that∆0 =s∆s.
Now let Λ = {ϕ : ∀n[∆0 ⊢ ϕ−· 2−n]}. Now ∆ = ∆0 ∪ Λ is maximal consistent, by construction of ∆0. Let C be the set
of constants in the Henkin language L∗, and letM be the model of T whose universe is the set of closed terms in C , as in
[3]. Note, however, that∆ (and, in particular,Λ) is not computable. We will show that this is no obstacle to producing the
required Turing machine forM, since that machine will never be asked in a particular computation to rule on the truth of a
formula, but only on its truth up to finite precision.
We now define the probabilistic Turing machine G which will witness thatM is probabilistically computable. We set
KA0 = K R0 = ∅. These two sets will collect initial segments of oracles which should signal our machine to accept (A) or reject
(R). For any set S of finite binary strings, we define the functions E(S) = {σ ⊇ τ : τ ∈ S} and
P(S) =
−
σ∈S
1
2lh(a)
.
At stage s, if∆s ⊢ ϕ−· k2n , then we will arrange that G accepts ϕ with probability at least 1− k2n . If KAs = ∅, then we find
2n−k nodes σ1, . . . , σ2n−k of length n in 2<ω−E(K Rs ), and let KAs+1 = {σ1, . . . , σ2n−k}. If KAs is nonempty and P(KAs ) ≥ 1− k2n ,
then we do nothing with KA. If KAs is nonempty and P(K
A
s ) < 1− k2n , then we find some setΣ of elements of 2<ω − E(K Rs )
with length n so that P(KAs ∪Σ) = 1− k2n , and let KAs+1 = KAs ∪Σ .
If∆s ⊢ k2n −· ϕ thenwewill arrange thatG rejectsϕwith probability at least k2n . If K Rs = ∅, thenwe find k nodes σ1, . . . , σk
of length n in 2<ω − E(KAs ), and let K Rs+1 = {σ1, . . . , σk}. If K Rs is nonempty and P(K Rs ) ≥ k2n , then we do nothing with K R. If
K Rs is nonempty and P(K
R
s ) <
k
2n , thenwe find some setΣ of elements of 2
<ω−E(KAs )with length n so that P(K Rs ∪Σ) = k2n ,
and let K Rs+1 = K Rs ∪Σ .
At this point, it is necessary to verify that certain aspects of the construction described so far are actually possible. In
particular, we need to show that whenwe search for elements of 2<ω−E(KAs ), for instance, there will be some. Now if E(KAs )
contains more than 2n − k1 elements, we must have P(KAs ) < 1 − k12n , so that we must have had ∆s ⊢ ϕ−· k12n . (Note that if
∆s ⊢ ϕ−· p and q > p, then also∆s ⊢ ϕ−· q.) This is established by Lemma 4.8.
Returning to the construction, at stage s, we will add more instructions. We will guarantee that for any σ ∈ E(KAs ), we
will have Gσ (ϕ) ↓= 0, and for any σ ∈ E(K Rs )we will have Gσ (ϕ) ↓= 1.
Let ϕ be a sentence in L∗, and suppose M(ϕ) = p. We need to show that G accepts ϕ with probability p. For each
q0, q1 ∈ D with q0 ≤M(ϕ) ≤ q1, there was some s for which∆s ⊢ ϕ−· q1 and for which∆s ⊢ q0−· ϕ, and at that stage, we
ensured that Gwould accept ϕ with probability between q0 and q1. Since this is true for all q0 ≤ p ≤ q1 ∈ D , it must follow
that G accepts ϕ with probability p.
Finally, we account for the metric. We note that T must contain the sentence supx,y ((x = y)−· d(x, y)), so that we have,
in the preceding construction, forced dM to be a metric onM. 
4.2. Some technical points of the construction
Lemma 4.6. We can effectively extendL to a languageL∗ and T to a consistent set Γ ofL∗-formulas which is Henkin complete.
Proof. Let L0 = L. For each n, let Ln+1 be the result of adding, for each formula ϕ in Ln, and for each x, p, q as in
the Definition 4.3, a new constant c(ϕ,x,p,q). We can also extend the theory T , beginning with Γ0 = T . For each n, the
set Γn+1 is produced by adding to T , for each formula ϕ in Ln and each x, p, q as in the Definition 4.3, the formula
(supx ϕ−· q) ∧ (p−· ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]). Let Γ =

n Γn. The consistency of Γ is demonstrated in [3].
Note that this construction is in every way effective. In particular, there is a (classically) computable function which will,
given p, q ∈ D and Gödel numbers for ϕ and x, give us a Gödel number for c(ϕ,x,p,q). Moreover, the set Γ is (classically)
computable. We writeL∗ =nLn, and C the set of all constants ofL∗. 
Lemma 4.7. We can effectively extend Γ to a consistent set ∆0 such that for all formulas ϕ,ψ in L∗ we have ϕ−· ψ ∈ ∆0 or
ψ −· ϕ ∈ ∆0. Moreover, there is a uniformly computable sequence (∆s)s∈ω of finite sets such that∆0 =s∆s.
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Proof. We denote by Γt the elements of Γ which are enumerated by stage t . We set ∆0 = Γ0 and F0 = ∅. At stage s + 1,
for the first pair ψ, ϕ of sentences from L∗ such that neither ψ −· ϕ nor ϕ−· ψ is in ∆s, we first let Fs+1 = Fs ∪ {(ψ, ϕ)}
and let θ be the conjunction of all elements of ∆s. Moreover, for each pair (ψ, ϕ) ∈ Fs+1 and each n ≤ t , we let c¯(ψ,ϕ,s)
be the constants from C which occur in (ψ −· ϕ)−· θ . We then check (effectively, since the theory is decidable), whether∀x¯ ((ψ −· ϕ)−· θ) (x¯/c¯(ψ,ϕ))◦T ≤ 12n . If so, then we add (ψ −· ϕ)−· 12n to form∆s+1. Otherwise, we do so with ϕ−· ψ . In either
case, we include all ofΓs+1 in∆s+1. Now∆0 =s∆s is as required. That this extension is consistent is established in [3]. 
Lemma 4.8. If there is some s such that∆s ⊢ ϕ−· k12n and∆s ⊢ k2n −· ϕ, then (1− k12n )+ k2n ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose not. Then 2n − k1 + k > 1, so that k − k1 > 0 and k > k1. However, we also have k2n −· k12n = 0, so that
k1 ≥ k, a contradiction. 
The situation for finding elements of 2<ω − E(K Rs ) is symmetric.
5. Probabilistically effective mathematics
In the present section, we will show, as a consequence of the effective completeness theorem, that ‘‘Probabilistically
Computable Mathematics’’ – that is, the part of mathematics that can be carried out on probabilistically computable
structures – is quite a lot more comprehensive than traditional effective mathematics. One key ingredient in the proof is the
method of proof in Lemma 3.4. Another is the effective completeness theorem of the previous section. The third ingredient,
to which we will turn in the following subsection, is the body of work known as ‘‘Reverse Mathematics’’. The main result of
the present section, Theorem 5.4, shows that probabilistically computable structures give rise, in a natural way, to a model
of the formal system ACA0, the import of which will be the subject of Section 5.1
5.1. Some relevant reverse mathematics
The name ‘‘Reverse Mathematics’’ refers to a program, originating in work of Friedman et al. [10] and later treated at
length in Simpson’smonograph [20] and the collection [21], which sought to classifymathematical theorems by the amount
of ‘‘comprehension’’ necessary to prove them. The Simpson book [20] is the canonical reference for all of the material in this
subsection. One represents all structures and all functions between them over a ground structure which will satisfy some
fragment of second-order arithmetic. Typically, one tries to prove a familiar theorem (e.g. the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem)
in the smallest possible fragment of second-order arithmetic, and then proves that a set of axioms for that fragment is
derivable from the theorem itself. It is for this second part of the practice that reverse mathematics is named.
The system RCA0 is the fragment of second-order arithmetic axiomatized by the Peano axioms (excepting induction),
induction on Σ01 formulas, and a comprehension axiom stipulating that all ∆
0
1 sets exist (i.e. they are represented by an
element in the ‘‘sets’’ sort – the second-order sort – of themodel of arithmetic). Themathematical statements whichmay be
proved in RCA0 are those which are effectively true, in the traditional sense. The Baire category theorem, the intermediate
value theorem, Urysohn’s lemma, the existence of an algebraic closure of a field, and the contraction mapping theorem are
all provable in RCA0.
Two other subsystems of second-order arithmetic will be of interest here. Each of them is properly stronger than RCA0.
Consequently, a mathematical system – for instance, the system of probabilistically computable structures – which satisfies
these stronger systems will viewmore mathematics as ‘‘effective’’ than does classical computation. Propositions 5.1 and 5.2
give concrete examples of this increase in strength.
The slightly stronger systemWKL0 consists of the axioms of RCA0, with the additional axiom that every binary-branching
tree has a path (the so-called ‘‘weak König lemma’’). This additional axiom, guaranteeing the existence of many more sets,
allows a much broader set of mathematical statements to be proved, as the following result demonstrates. Moreover, each
of the theorems listed could be added to RCA0with identical results: each of them, when added to RCA0, is equivalent to
WKL0. This list is wildly incomplete, and should primarily serve to exemplify the type of result which is possible. I havemade
no effort to credit the original sources of these results, as this information has been exhaustively documented in [20], from
which this result is extracted.
Proposition 5.1. Under the axioms of RCA0, the following are equivalent:
(1) WKL0
(2) The Heine–Borel theorem
(3) Every continuous real-valued function on a compact metric space has a supremum
(4) The local existence theorem for solutions of finite systems of ordinary differential equations
(5) Every countable field of characteristic 0 has a unique algebraic closure
(6) Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
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The third and final systemwhichwill concern us here is ACA0, which consists of the axioms of RCA0, plus the ‘‘arithmetic
comprehension axiom’’. For any set X ⊆ ω, the Turing jump of X , denoted X ′, is the set {n : MXn (n) ↓}, whereMXn denotes the
Turing machine with index n and oracle X . The arithmetic comprehension axiom guarantees the existence of all arithmetic
sets (including, for instance, the Turing jump of any set in the model). Again, I extract the following summary from [20], and
refer the reader there for the full history of these results.
Proposition 5.2. Under the axioms of RCA0, the following are equivalent:
(1) ACA0
(2) the Bolzano–Weierstrass Theorem
(3) Every Cauchy sequence of real numbers is convergent
(4) Every countable field is isomorphic to a subfield of a countable algebraically closed field
(5) Every countable vector space over Q has a basis.
Finally, and most importantly, Weak König’s Lemma is provable in ACA0, so that every model of ACA0 is a model, too, of
WKL0.
5.2. A model of ACA0
It is not quite true that the class of probabilistically computable structures constitutes a model of ACA0. However, the
deficiency is really only one of category. The main result of the present section is that when this class of structures is placed
in the right context, we do indeed have a model of ACA0.
In particular, we will show that the natural numbers with their usual first-order operations, together with the family
of sets X for which there is some probabilistically computable structureM with universe N in which X is quantifier-free
definable (i.e. X there is some continuous first-order formula ϕ such that X is the locus of all x such thatM(ϕ(x)) = 0), is a
model ofACA0. Thiswill show that, among probabilistically computable structures, all of the results listed in Propositions 5.2
and 5.1 hold, in addition to thosewhich are provable inRCA0 (thosewhich are true among classically computable structures).
Consider the familyPC of sets A of pairs (x, p) such that there is a probabilistic Turingmachine, depending only on A, which
will accept xwith probability p.
Proposition 5.3. The class PC is closed under the Turing jump.
Proof. Let U be a Π01 subset of W , where W ∈ PC (say that Φ is the Turing machine witnessing W ∈ PC). Then U has a
definition of the form
∀y R((x, p), y).
Since the real numbers pmust be uniformly computable, there are computable sequences (qxℓt)t∈ω and (qxut)t∈ω of rationals
such that qxℓt is strictly increasing with limit p and qxut is strictly decreasing with limit p, and such that both converge faster
than 2−t .
We will construct a decidable CFO theory TU describing a weak structure with two predicates, xˆ and xˆ1 for each xwhich
occurs as the first coordinate of an element (x, p) of W , such that (xˆ−· xˆ1) ∧ (xˆ1−· xˆ) if and only if (x, p) ∈ U . Then, by
Theorem 4.5, there will be a probabilistically computable weak structure satisfying TU , in which U is defined by a quantifier-
free formula. Thus, we will have U ∈ PC.
We will work in a continuous signature with two unary predicate symbols, xˆ and xˆ1, for each element x with some pair
(x, p) ∈ W . Let TU,0 = ∅. At stage t , for each x ≤ t , if Φt(x) ↓= 0 with probability at least qxℓt and for all y ≤ t we have
R((x, p), y), then we will include qxℓt −· xˆ1 in TU,t+1. IfΦt(x) ↓= 1 with probability at least 1− qxℓt and for all y ≤ t we have
R((x, p), y), then we will include xˆ1−· qxℓt in TU,t+1. Meanwhile, we also include qxℓt −· xˆ, xˆ−· qxut , and xˆ1−· qxut . Let TU be the
union of the TU,t ’s.
Now TU is decidable since xˆ◦T and (xˆ1)
◦
T , where x ranges over all first coordinates of W , must be uniformly computable.
Thus, there is a probabilistically decidable weak structureMU |H TU . Now for any (x, p) ∈ W , we have (x, p) ∈ U if and only
if (xˆ−· xˆ1) ∧ (xˆ1−· xˆ), as required. 
Theorem 5.4. LetN be the structure whose first-order part is (N,+, ·, 0, 1), and whose second-order part consists of the sets X
such that there exists some probabilistically computable structureM with universe N such that X is quantifier-free definable in
M. ThenN is a model of ACA0.
Proof. It is clear that N satisfies the first-order Peano axioms. Moreover, recursive comprehension is satisfied, since we
may define any ∆01 subset by a quantifier-free formula. It remains to show that the second-order universe of N is closed
under the Turing jump.
Let S be an infinite set in the second-order part of N , defined by the quantifier-free continuous formula ϕ inM (if it is
not infinite, we may replace it by a Turing-equivalent infinite set). Now S ′ is defined by {x : ΦSx (x) ↓}, or, equivalently,
{x : ∃t ΦStx,t (x) ↓}.
This set is 1-equivalent to aΣ01 subset of S, and thus to aΣ
0
1 subset T of D(M). Then, by Proposition 5.3, the complement of
T is quantifier-free definable in a probabilistically computable structure on N, and so both T and the complement of T are
in the second-order part ofN . 
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6. Time complexity of structures
One of themost important applications of probabilistic Turingmachines is their role in computational complexity theory
(see [15,18,13]). Let P be some decision problem.We say thatQ is of class RP (for randomized polynomial if and only if there is
a probabilistic Turing machineMQ , halting in time polynomial in the length of the input, such that if x ∈ Q , thenMQ accepts
xwith probability at least 34 , and if x /∈ Q , thenMQ rejects x certainly. This class has the property that P ⊆ RP ⊆ NP.1
Another complexity class of interest is the class BPP. We say that Q is of class BPP if and only if there is a probabilistic
Turing machine MQ , halting in time polynomial in the length of the input, such that if x ∈ Q , then MQ accepts x with
probability at least 34 , and if x /∈ Q , thenMQ rejects xwith probability at least 34 . Here we know that RP ⊆ BPP ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2 .
Definition 6.1 (Cenzer–Remmel [8]). Let A be a computable structure. We say that A is uniformly polynomial time if the
atomic diagram ofA is a polynomial time set.
Clearly, A ∈ P if and only if the structure (ω, A) is polynomial time. Also, for any polynomial time structure M and
any quantifier-free definable A ⊆ Mn, we have A ∈ P. We can extend Definition 6.1 in a routine way for probabilistically
computable structures.
Definition 6.2. We say that a probabilistically computable structure is polynomial time if and only if there is some
probabilistic Turing machine T such that, for every pair (ϕ, p) ∈ D(M) the machine T halts in polynomial time and accepts
ϕ with probability p.
Now we can characterize the members of BPP in terms of continuous weak structures.
Theorem 6.3. The class BPP can be identified with the class of quantifier-free definable sets in polynomial time probabilistically
computable structures in the following way:
(1) Let A ∈ BPP be a subset ofω. Then there is a polynomial time probabilistically computable weak structureM and a polynomial
time computable function f : ω→ M such that there is a quantifier-free formula ϕ(x) such that ϕ(x) ≤ 14 for x ∈ f (A) and
ϕ(x) ≥ 34 for x ∈M− f (A).
(2) Let M be a polynomial time probabilistically computable weak structure, and let A, B be quantifier-free disjoint definable
subsets ofMn, where
inf {d(x, y) : x ∈ A, y ∈ B} > 0
and A ∪ B is classically computably enumerable. Then A and B are each of class BPP.
Proof. Toward the first point, let M be a probabilistic Turing machine witnessing that A ∈ BPP. We letM be the structure
(ω,A), whereA is a unary predicate andA(x) is the probability thatM accepts x. We giveM the discrete metric, allowing
A itself to be the formula defining A.
For the second point, let A be defined by ϕ(x¯), and B by ψ(x¯). Now for a¯ ∈ A ∪ B, to check whether a¯ ∈ A, we compute
M(ϕ(a¯)−· ψ(a¯)). The computation runs in polynomial time, and a¯ is acceptedwith probability at least 12+inf {d(a¯, y) : y ∈ B}
when a¯ ∈ A and with probability at most 12 − inf {d(a¯, y) : y ∈ B}when a¯ ∈ B. 
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